What is poverty? Concepts and measures by Dag Ehrenpreis
Poverty
International Poverty Centre
United Nations Development Programme December  2006
What is poverty?
Concepts and measures2 United Nations Development Programme
T
he international development community has had poverty in focus for more than
a decade. At summit meetings and other occasions, world leaders have stated and
reconfirmed their agreement that poverty must be reduced and eventually eradicated.
The political commitment is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for this to
happen. Analysts, policy-makers and practitioners need appropriate concepts and
dedicated measures to enable progress from rhetoric and general policy statements
to action and results on the ground.
In this issue of IPC’s journal Poverty in Focus we present ten articles intended to throw
light on the question of how best to define and measure poverty.
Robert Chambers outlines five clusters of meanings and reminds us of the importance of
the analysis and views of poor people themselves and their many meanings. When they
get to express their views, we get a case for changing language, concepts and
measures in development. The key issue is whose reality counts – theirs or ours?
Peter Townsend provides an historical perspective of the poverty concept and the setting
of poverty lines. Three poverty concepts have evolved, based on ideas of subsistence,
basic needs and relative deprivation. Since material needs are socially determined, we
need a new international poverty line based on what is required in different countries
to surmount material and social deprivation.
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr describes the multidimensional poverty measures developed by
UNDP’s Human Development Reports since 1990, especially the Human Poverty Index
(HPI). It shows a large spread of human poverty among countries with similar levels of
income poverty and thus, HPI is only weakly correlated with income poverty. Recent HPI
trends are also presented and discussed.
Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi, Ruhi Saith and Frances Stewart analyse empirical evidence to see
if and why the definition of poverty matters. They also report on field testing in two
developing countries of four different approaches. These are shown to have different
implications for policy and also for targeting, since they identify different causes and
effects of poverty, and different people as being poor.
Gustav Ranis, Frances Stewart and Emma Samman review the various listings of human
wellbeing and poverty elements, thus identifying a comprehensive set of dimensions
in order to empirically explore whether UNDP’s Human Development Index is adequate
or needs to be supplemented. They show that assessing human development fully
requires a broader set of indicators.
Peter Edward outlines a moral concept of absolute poverty and defines an Ethical
Poverty Line derived from globally standardised and ethically justifiable wellbeing
indicators. Applying it to actual income data shows that world poverty by a moral
definition is much larger than by current measures, and so is the required global
income redistribution.
Lord Meghnad Desai finds the definitions of absolute poverty static, calorific, asocial
and atheoretical. He proposes a new poverty line to be based on the need to
maintain individual labour capacities intact, thus connecting to health, nutrition
and monetary measures.
Ravi Kanbur considers the conundrums of measuring poverty when populations change
and analyses three population size scenarios – increased, decreased and unchanged, but
with churning around the poverty line. He delivers some remarkable points to consider.
Nanak Kakwani proposes a multidimensional poverty concept that is causally linked to
command over economic resources. He argues for an income poverty line that reflects
the cost of achieving basic human needs.
Sabine Alkire in response to Kakwani argues that it is not the cause of poverty that
matters, but what is actionable by public policy. There are many ways to measure
capability deprivation. The debate ends, for now, with a rejoinder by Kakwani.
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The flood of development rhetoric
on poverty, the primacy accorded by
lenders and donors to the Millennium
Development Goals, of which the reduction
of extreme poverty is the first and usually
considered the most important, and the
frequency with which reducing, alleviating
or eliminating poverty is seen as a prime
goal and measure of development –
these factors make it matter more than
ever to know what poverty is. What it is
taken to mean depends on who asks the
question, how it is understood, and who
responds.  From this perspective, it has at
least five clusters of meanings.
The first is income-poverty or its common
proxy (because less unreliable to measure)
consumption-poverty. This needs no
elaboration. When many, especially
economists, use the word poverty they
are referring to these measures.  Poverty
is what can be and has been measured,
and measurement and comparisons
provide endless scope for debate.
The second cluster of meanings is
material lack or want.  Besides income, this
includes lack of or little wealth and lack
or low quality of other assets such as
shelter, clothing, furniture, personal
means of transport, radios or television,
and so on. This also tends to include no
or poor access to services.
A third cluster of meanings derives from
Amartya Sen, and is expressed as
capability deprivation, referring to what we
can or cannot do, can or cannot be. This
includes but goes beyond material lack
or want to include human capabilities,
for example skills and physical abilities,
and also self-respect in society.
A fourth cluster takes a yet more broadly
multi-dimensional view of deprivation,
with material lack or want as only one of
several mutually reinforcing dimensions.
These four clusters of the meanings of
poverty have all been constructed by
“us”, by development professionals.
They are expressions of “our” education,
training, mindsets, experiences and
reflections.  They reflect our power, as
non-poor people, to make definitions
according to our perceptions. And the
primacy we accord to poverty
alleviation, reduction or elimination
implies that these meanings that we
give are fundamental to what
development should be about.
One expression of this has twelve
dimensions, each one potentially having
an impact on all of the others, and
vice versa, thus emphasising the
interdependence of the dimensions of
poverty as we see them (see figure below).
Another expression of this has five
dimensions to illustrate development as
What poverty is taken
to mean depends on
who asks the question,
how it is understood,
and who responds.
Our common meanings
have all been constructed
by us, non-poor people.





Ours, as we construct it
with our mindsets and for
our purposes? Or theirs
as we enable them
to analyse and express it?
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good change. Development thus can be
seen as shifting from illbeing to wellbeing
with equity, with interventions to
enhance wellbeing possible at any of
the five points (see figure on the right).
But these dimensions are all abstractions,
to varying degrees reductionist, based on
our analysis and views. They tend to
overlook and ignore the analysis and views
of the objects of the definition and
description – “the poor”, that is people who
are in a bad condition variously described
as poor, marginalised, vulnerable, excluded
or deprived. There is then a fifth cluster,
which is the multiplicity of their meanings.
These dimensions have been elicited
in many contexts, most extensively
perhaps in the World Bank’s participatory
research programme Voices of the Poor,
in which over 20,000 poor women and
men from 23 countries were convened in
small groups and facilitated to analyse
and express their realities.  Questions
had to be confronted concerning words,
translations, languages and concepts.
The word poverty translated into other
languages carries different connotations.
This was one factor in deciding to seek
better insights and comparability by
inviting the local analysts to use their own
words and concepts for illbeing or bad
quality of life, and wellbeing or good
quality of life. Even allowing for the pitfalls
of analysing and imposing outsiders’
categories on their diverse responses,
values and realities, it was striking how
common and strong the same dimensions
were across cultures and contexts.
There were many poverties or deprivations.
Dimensions of the bad life included not
only income-poverty and material lack, but
many others, some of them represented in
the web of poverty’s disadvantages in the
figure, for example poverty of time, living
and working in bad places – “the places
of the poor” and bad social, especially
gender, relations.  Others were the body as
the main asset of many poor people,
indivisible, uninsured, and vulnerable
to flipping from asset to liability; many
aspects of insecurity, worry and anxiety;
and pervasively powerlessness.
The many ideas of wellbeing and the
good life to which people aspired had
striking commonalities – material
wellbeing, having enough; bodily
wellbeing, being and appearing well;
many aspects of social wellbeing
including being able to settle children,
and being able to help others; security;
and freedom of choice and action.
Both these commonalities and local
differences make a case for changing
language, concepts and measures in
development.
The case is for the language of illbeing
and wellbeing to be widely used in
addition to poverty and wealth, which
are only one part of them. It is for
repeated participatory processes to
enable local people, especially the
poorest, most marginalised and most
vulnerable, to analyse and monitor the
quality of their lives, and for this to be
fed back regularly to policy-makers.
It is for policy-makers to spend time
living in poor communities and
appreciating their conditions and
realities firsthand.
If we are seriously pro-poor
professionals, the answer to “What is
poverty?” is “That is the wrong question.”
It is our question, not theirs.  The
question of those who are poor,
marginalised and vulnerable is more
likely to be, in varied forms and many
languages with different nuances:
“What can you do to reduce our bad
experiences of life and living, and to
enable us to achieve more of the good
things in life to which we aspire?”
Policies and actions that follow would
then be designed to reduce illbeing and
enhance wellbeing in their own terms.
The MDGs may help, but are far from
enough for this, and may at times even
misdirect effort.
Direct actions towards their achievement
may often not present the best priorities
and paths.  For they narrow and
standardise vision, leave out much
that matters, and do not allow for the
multifarious ways in which people can
be enabled to enjoy a better life.
Policies and actions need to be informed
much less by top-down targets and
much more by the diverse bottom-up
realities of the powerless.
The questions are then: whose reality
counts?  Ours? Or theirs?  Or more
precisely:  ours, as we construct it with
our mindsets and for our purposes?
Or theirs as we enable them to analyse
and express it?
Robert Chambers: “Power, knowledge and
policy influence: reflections on an experience”
in Karen Brock and Rosemary McGee (eds)
Knowing Poverty: Critical reflections on
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Poor people are denied
the resources to fulfil
social demands and
observe customs.
We need better poverty
measures and regular
UN monitoring reports.
Historically, poverty has been related
to income, which remains at the core of
the concept today. However, “income” is
itself no less problematic a concept than
“poverty”; it too has to be carefully and
precisely elaborated. Other resources such
as assets, income in kind and subsidies to
public services and employment should
be imputed to arrive at a comprehensive
but accurate measure of income.
People can be said to be in poverty when
they are deprived of income and other
resources needed to obtain the conditions
of life—the diets, material goods,
amenities, standards and services—
that enable them to play the roles, meet
the obligations and participate in the
relationships and customs of their society.
The determination of a poverty line cannot
be based on an arbitrary selection of a low
level of income. Only scientific criteria
independent of income can justify where
the poverty line should be drawn. The
multiplicity and severity of different
types of deprivation can constitute those
criteria. The key is therefore to define a
threshold of income below which people
are found to be thus deprived.
The measure of multiple deprivations
must be decided on the basis of evidence
about each and every sphere of the range
of social and individual activities people
perform in fulfilment of individual and
family needs, and social obligations. The
degree of material and social deprivation
relative to income is the basis for
ascertaining the threshold amount of
income ordinarily required by households
of different compositions to surmount
poverty. The application of this method
permits analysis of trends in poverty in
and across different countries.
The understanding and relief of poverty
has been a major human preoccupation
for many centuries. Since the 1880s, three
alternative conceptions of poverty have
evolved as a basis for international and
comparative work. They depend
principally on the ideas of subsistence,
basic needs and relative deprivation.
The subsistence idea was a result of work
prompted by nutritionists in Victorian
England. Families were defined to be in
poverty when their incomes were not
“sufficient to obtain the minimum
necessaries for the maintenance of
merely physical efficiency”. A family was
treated as being in poverty if its income
minus rent fell short of the poverty line.
Although allowance was made in
calculating the income level for clothing,
fuel and some other items, this allowance
was very small, and food accounted for
much the greatest share of subsistence.
These ideas have influenced scientific
practice and international and national
policies for over 100 years. Examples are
the statistical measures adopted to
describe social conditions, at first within
individual countries but later with wide
application by international agencies such
as the World Bank. The idea of subsistence
was freely exported to member States of
the former British Empire, e.g. for setting
the wages of blacks in South Africa and
framing development plans in India and
Malaysia. In the United States, “subsistence”
remains the basis of the official measure
of poverty.
The use of “subsistence” to define
poverty has been criticized because it
implies that human needs are mainly
physical rather than also social needs.
People are not simply individual
organisms requiring replacement of
sources of physical energy; they are
social beings expected to perform
socially demanding roles as workers,
citizens, parents, partners, neighbours
and friends. Moreover, they are not
simply consumers of physical goods but
producers of those goods and are also
expected to act out different roles in
their various social associations. They are
dependent on collectively provided6 United Nations Development Programme
utilities and facilities. These needs apply
universally and not merely in the rich
industrial societies.
The lack of elaborate social institutions
and services in low-income countries and
their scant resources direct our attention
to whether or not the most basic material
subsistence needs can be met in those
countries. Meeting such needs as the
satisfaction of hunger is widely accepted
as a priority. Such needs have been
included in the categorisation of
“absolute” poverty, which however would
better be labelled “extreme” or “severe.”
Physical needs are subject to rapid
change because of shifts in social activity
and demand patterns. The need for
material goods, their relevance to the
society of the day, and even the goods
themselves, are not, after all, fixed or
unvarying. And the amount and kind,
and thus the cost, of food depend on
work, climate and social customs. So
material needs turn out to be socially
determined in different ways.
By the 1970s a second formulation—that
of “basic needs”—began to exert wide
influence, supported strongly by the ILO.
Two elements were included. First,
minimum consumption needs of a
family: adequate food, shelter and
clothing, as well as certain household
furniture and equipment. And second,
essential services provided by and for the
community at large, such as safe water,
sanitation, public transport and health
care, education and cultural facilities. In
rural areas, basic needs also include land,
agricultural tools and access to farming.
The “basic needs” concept is an extension
of the subsistence concept. In addition
to material needs for individual physical
survival and efficiency, there are the facilities
and services—for health care, sanitation
and education—required by local
communities and populations as a whole.
The attractions to some of the
“subsistence” concept included its limited
scope and therefore limited implications
for policy and political action. In the past
and into the present, it seemed easier to
restrict the meaning of poverty to material
and physical needs than also to include
the non-fulfilment of social roles, given
the overriding emphasis of individualism.
The “basic needs” concept, on the other
hand, aimed at establishing at least some
of the preconditions for community
development. It played a prominent part
in national development plans fostered
by the international community,
especially UN agenices.
In the late 20th century, a third social
formulation of the meaning of poverty
was developed: relative deprivation.
“Relativity” as suggested above, applies to
both income and other resources and also
to material and social conditions. In the
21st century societies are passing through
such rapid change that a poverty standard
devised at some historical date in the past
is difficult to justify under new conditions.
People living in the present are not subject
to the same laws, obligations and customs
that applied to a previous era.
Globalisation is connecting peoples and
their standards of living, while inequalities
within and between countries are growing.
There are, therefore, major objections
to merely updating any historical
benchmark of poverty on the basis of
some index of prices. Over many years
the “relativity” of meanings of poverty
has come to be recognized, in part if not
comprehensively. Adam Smith, for example,
recognized the ways in which “necessities”
were defined by custom in the early part
of the 19th century, citing the labourer’s
need to wear a shirt as an example.
It is not enough to describe poverty as
a condition applying to those whose
disposable income is low relative to that
of others. This is to fail to distinguish
conceptually between inequality and
poverty. Poor people are not just the
victims of a maldistribution of resources
but, more exactly, they lack, or are
denied, the resources to fulfil social
demands and observe the customs as
well as the unfolding laws, of society.
This criterion lends itself to scientific
observation, measurement and analysis
of multiple deprivations.
However, as with any formulation, there
are problems in defining poverty
operationally. Under the “relative
deprivation” approach, a threshold of
income is envisaged, according to size
and type of family, below which
withdrawal or exclusion from active
membership of society is common.
Establishing that threshold depends on
accumulating the available evidence, and
whether sociological and economic
approaches may be reconciled.
Such reconciliation is some distance away.
Despite the influence of Amartya Sen’s
contributions to development studies for
two decades, his ideas on capabilities have
not reached the mainstream of poverty
analysis among economists, and have
been said to leave important gaps.
There are forms of impoverishment, for
example through social exclusion, when
individual capabilities to overcome
poverty are not at issue. Those capabilities
are also identified as originating within
the individual rather than with groups or
nations collectively or being determined
externally by market conglomerates. Again,
the capabilities approach does not seem
to address the structural sources of the
capabilities of the rich and powerful.
Capabilities are different from perceptions.
These sometimes offer a valuable
correction to independent analysis
of behaviour and living conditions.
In an attempt to define poverty
operationally, the World Bank in 1990
adopted a rule-of-thumb measure of
US$ 370 per year per person at 1985
prices (the “dollar a day” poverty line) for
poor countries. This crude indicator may
have been a convenient interim measure
for practical purposes, a short-term
expedient, but has not turned out to
be of continuing value.
Eliminating poverty requires better
definition and measurement. We need
(i) an international poverty line that
defines a threshold of income (including
in kind) required in different countries to
surmount material and social deprivation;
(ii) regular reports on the extent of poverty
in every country, based on measures of
both “absolute” – i.e. “extreme” – and
“overall” poverty, as agreed in 1995 at the
World Summit for Social Development.
Thus, antipoverty policies must be
monitored and evaluated regularly and
on a much larger scale by governments,
by the United Nations, by the
international financial institutions and by
other relevant international agencies. 
Townsend, P.: Introduction, Compendium
of best practices in poverty measurement;
Expert Group on Poverty Statistics (Rio
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Poverty as a public policy concern,
whether at the global, national or
community level, is now widely
considered to be a multidimensional
problem. Over the last few decades, new
perspectives on poverty have challenged
the focus on income and consumption as
the defining condition of poor people.
Studies of the problems of poor people
and communities, and of the obstacles
and opportunities to improving their
situation, have led to an understanding of
poverty as a complex set of deprivations.
These alternative perspectives have
refocused the concept of poverty as a
human condition that reflects failures in
many dimensions of human life – hunger,
unemployment, homelessness, illness
and health care, powerlessness and
victimisation, and social injustice; they all
add up to an assault on human dignity.
Strategies to eradicate poverty require
not only economic growth and
redistribution but also direct intervention
in many areas such as expanding
education, removing discrimination and
securing social injustice; different types
of deprivations in human lives are
interrelated and reinforce one another.
For example, lack of education often
defines the condition of a poor person but
it is also an obstacle to other important
aspects of a person’s wellbeing, e.g.
employment and income, good health
and health care and other basic amenities
such as clean water and sanitation. These
are also interrelated with discrimination
and lack of access to justice.
These ideas are not new but what is
relatively new is their emerging as a
consensus among policy makers, the
public and development specialists. This is
reflected in the adoption of the Millennium
Development Goals, and as a conceptual
shift in the treatment of poverty by the
World Bank in their World Development
Reports from 1980 up to the WDR 2000/01,
which analysed poverty in terms of
opportunities, empowerment and
vulnerability. This consensus builds on a
lively debate that challenged the income
focus and argued for a human focus.
This debate included various
perspectives on poverty, such as basic
needs, participatory assessment, human
rights, social exclusion, and capabilities;
all of which are discussed elsewhere in
this journal. The analytical application
of the capability approach has been
developed and diffused through UNDP’s
Human Development Reports (HDR). They
view poverty as reflecting the lack of
choices and opportunities in the key areas
of education, health, and command over
resources, as well as voice related to
democratic processes. The first HDR in
1990 introduced the Human
Development Index (HDI).
Despite this shift to a multidimensional
poverty concept, monitoring has continued
to rely on the income measure. At the
global level, the $1/day (PPP) measure
developed and updated regularly by the
World Bank is the one that is consistently
used to monitor the size and trends in
global poverty. At the national level,
most governments define poverty
threshold lines by household income.
Measures of poverty used by researchers
also rely on the income- and consumption-
based national and international
measures. For sure, a wide range of other
indicators are used at both global and
national levels. For example, the eight
Millennium Development Goals have 49
indicators to monitor progress. But it is
the income measure that is most used
to gauge trends overall.
One reason why the $1/day measure
is relied upon for overall monitoring
purposes is the need to look at one
number rather than 49 different ones to
make an overall assessment of progress.
It is useful to have focused measures of
Human poverty is
a complex set of
deprivations in
many dimensions.
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critical areas of human wellbeing such as
child mortality or access to clean water.
But it is difficult to decide which one to
use in making an overall assessment
about whether poverty overall is
improving or deteriorating. A composite
measure therefore is needed to make this
overall assessment that can aggregate
the different features of deprivation.
The HDR 1996 introduced the Human
Poverty Index (HPI) to fill this gap. It is a
composite measure set in the capability
and human development space, drawing
on the several important perspectives
that have enriched our understanding of
poverty. In this framework, poverty is the
deprivation side of human development –
the denial of basic choices and
opportunities to lead a long, healthy,
creative and free life; to enjoy a decent
standard of living; and to participate
in the life of the community including
political freedom and cultural choices.
HPI is a measure of capability deprivation;
it aims to capture ‘human poverty’ as
distinct from ‘income poverty’, i.e. failures
to achieve the basic capabilities needed
for human functioning rather than any
given level of consumption or income.
But like the HDI, the HPI is a highly
incomplete measure and does not
capture many of the dimensions of a
full life, nor the social conditions that are
necessary. Sen refers to five ‘instrumental
freedoms’ as essential to a life of dignity,
namely economic facilities, social
opportunities, political freedom, security
and transparency guarantees. Neither the
HPI nor HDI include indicators of political
freedom, security and transparency.
The challenges of measuring human
poverty are considerable, starting with
the selection of key dimensions, their
weighting, and a search for appropriate
data sets. Important aspects of human
poverty, notably those relating to
Some very low-income
countries reduced HPI
more than many with
higher income levels.
HPI trends 1990-2002
        Country Change in HPI HPI Rank Rank Change
 HPI-value (%) 1990 2002 1990 2002   in ranks*
India -12.1 43.5 31.4 33 26 -7
Viet Nam -11.7 31.7 20.0 25 22 -3
Ghana -10.5 36.5 26.0 26 24 -2
Tunisia -10.0 29.1 19.2 23 21 -2
Nicaragua -9.2 27.5 18.3 22 20 -2
Uganda -8.9 45.3 36.4 35 30 -5
Morocco -8.6 43.1 34.5 31 27 -4
Indonesia -8.3 26.1 17.8 20 18 -2
Guatemala -8.3 30.8 22.5 24 23 -1
Senegal -7.6 51.7 44.1 40 37 -3
Madagascar -4.8 40.7 35.9 29 29 0
Malawi 3.4 43.4 46.8 32 40 8
Botswana 19.8 23.7 43.5 17 36 19
Zimbabwe 25.8 26.3 52.0 21 41 20
*  Negative value = rank improvement
participation such as political freedom
and cultural choices, are simply not
quantifiable or lack data and thus not
included. Still, HPI is a more adequate
measure of deprivations in human lives
than the income poverty measure.
HPI focuses on three of the four key
dimensions of HDI: the capability to
(i) survive, measured by vulnerability to
early death defined as before 40 years;
(ii) be knowledgeable, measured by the
adult illiteracy rate; and (iii) have access
to private income as well as public
provisioning, measured by the
percentage of malnourished children
under five and by the percentage of
people without access to safe water.
These particular measures are not so
relevant in the richer industrial societies.
Thus, an adjusted index (HPI-2) was
developed with indicators more suited
to high income OECD countries. The HPI
estimates are published in the annual
HDRs.  The new HDR 2006 shows some
interesting trends that contrast it from
the $1 a day measure. Although HPI and
the $1 a day headcount measure are
broadly correlated, there are considerable
divergences between them (see page 9).
The correlation between income poverty
and human poverty is weak, and there is
a large spread in levels of human poverty
among countries with similar levels of
income poverty.  Some countries with
high levels of human poverty around
40% such as Pakistan and Yemen have
relatively low levels of income poverty
around 15-17% like Ecuador and China,
which have reduced human poverty to
around 10%.
These data highlight both achievements
and challenges for governments. Some
countries with very low GDP per capita
have achieved significantly more
reduction in human poverty than
countries with higher levels of income.
Tanzania for example reduced human
poverty to 36%, which is still high,
though not when compared to their
income poverty of 58% and per capitaInternational Poverty Centre   Poverty In Focus   December  2006    9
Country designations
GDP of only PPP$ 674. This level of human
poverty is similar to or lower than
countries with much higher incomes,
such as Pakistan (36%) and Bangladesh
(44%), where per capita GDP is
respectively PPP$ 2225 and  PPP$ 1870.
Trends in human poverty are available in
HDR 2004 for 12 years up to 2002 for 44
countries. They show important progress;
40 out of 44 countries show a net
reduction in HPI, with India, Viet Nam,
Ghana, Tunisia, Nicaragua, Uganda,
Morocco, Indonesia and Guatemala having
reduced poverty by over 8 percentage
points.  It is encouraging to note the
many African countries having made
progress. However, dramatic increases
in human poverty were registered in
Zimbabwe (26%) and Botswana (20%).
HPI estimates so far have shown
a number of strengths:
• Policy priorities: Countries that show
higher levels of human poverty in
relation to income poverty or per
capita income point to a need for
greater policy attention on low social
achievements, especially public
provisioning related to health and
education. Although HPI does not
capture the full extent of
deprivations in human lives,
it covers the essential aspects
of life that relate to social and
economic policies, and that go
beyond income alone.
• Feasibility: The HPI demonstrates
the relevance and the feasibility of a
multi-dimensional aggregate measure
to monitor human as opposed to
income poverty.
• Data availability: HPI uses
internationally comparable data.
While there are many gaps, the gaps
in these data are fewer than the gaps
in the PPP $1 a day estimates.  HPI is
estimated for 102 developing
countries while the PPP $1 a day
estimate is available for 94 countries.
Further work that could develop a more
useful measure to monitor poverty include:
• Coverage: HPI covers 95 countries as
compared with 174 countries for HDI.
• Global and regional estimates.  HPI is
of particular interest for monitoring
global trends in the way that the
$1/day income poverty estimates do.
Global and regional estimates of HPI
should be attempted.
HPI estimates show the relevance of
aggregate, internationally comparable
measures of multidimensional poverty.
Intercountry comparisons of HPI sharpen
the focus on human poverty that requires
policy attention, and should be further
developed to provide a global
monitoring tool.
UNDP Human Development Report 2006:
Beyond Scarcity: Power, poverty and the
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There is now world-wide agreement
on poverty reduction as an overriding
goal of development policy, but not on
the definition of poverty. Does this
matter for policy and practice? We
reviewed the monetary, capability, social
exclusion and participatory approaches
to defining and measuring poverty; they
do have different implications for policy,
and also for targeting since they identify
different people as being poor.
There are a number of issues involved in
defining and measuring poverty. Is it
confined to material aspects of life, or
does it also include social, cultural and
political aspects? Is it about what may be
achieved, given the resources available
and the prevailing environment, or what
is actually achieved? Should definitions
and measurement methods be applied in
the same way in all countries and used for
comparisons? Are there “objective”
methods, or are value judgements
involved? What is the rationale for
defining a poverty line? Should it be
absolute as in the Millennium Development
Goals and in most developing countries,
or relative as in the rich OECD countries?
Some further issues: Should poverty be
defined and measured at the individual,
household or geographic area level; and
for what respective purpose? The
multidimensionality issue—considering
that individual well-being/poverty
manifests itself in multiple dimensions,
should an aggregate index be
developed, and how? Finally, the time
horizon over which poverty is identified
needs to be specified—many people
move in and out of poverty over seasons
and years, hence the longer the time
perspective the less poverty will appear.
The monetary approach to the
identification and measurement of
poverty is the most commonly used.
It identifies poverty with a shortfall in
consumption (or income) from some
poverty line. The valuation of the
different components of income or
consumption is done at market prices,
which requires identification of the
relevant market and the imputation of
monetary values for those items that are
not valued through the market (such as
subsistence production and social services
and, in principle, other public goods).
Various technical solutions have been
suggested for differentiating the poor
and non-poor using the monetary
approach, although there is no theory of
poverty that would clearly differentiate
the poor from the non-poor. Relative
poverty lines can be determined by
political consensus. Attempts to find an
objective basis for an absolute poverty
line aim at identifying behavioural
breaks between the poor and non-poor.
The nutritional needs for survival provide
the most common basis for such a break.
Yet there are problems about nutritionally-
based poverty lines. Differing metabolic
rates, activities, size, gender and age
among people mean that what is adequate
varies among them. Moreover, differing
tastes, food availability and prices affect
how much money income is needed to
secure any particular level of nutrition.
Moreover, poverty lines are often drawn
up at the level of the household,
disregarding how the intra-household
distribution affects individual nutrition
levels. All this suggests that it is not
possible to draw up a unique poverty
line based on nutritional requirements.
The three other approaches to deprivation
address some of the perceived defects of
the monetary approach.
The capability approach (CA) rejects
monetary income as its measure of well-
Does the Definition of
Poverty Matter?
Comparing four approaches
by Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi,*





implications for  targeting
and policy.
Empirical evidence shows that
poverty rates vary a lot when
different concepts and
measures are used.






measures are essential for
poverty-centred
development policies.
* The World Bank, Washington, D. C.International Poverty Centre   Poverty In Focus   December  2006    11
being, and instead focuses on indicators
of freedom to live a valued life. Poverty is
defined as failure to achieve certain
minimal or basic capabilities, i.e. the
ability to satisfy adequately certain
crucially important functionings. Many
analysts have proposed generic lists of
essential capabilities, but they tend to
reflect current western conceptions of the
“good life”, raising doubts on its ability to
reflect an “overlapping consensus”.
Defining operational CA measures poses
a number of methodological issues.
The concept of social exclusion (SE)
describes the processes of marginalization
and deprivation that can arise even in
rich countries with comprehensive welfare
provisions. It is a reminder of the
multiple faces of deprivation. SE is
perhaps the most difficult to interpret
of the poverty concepts under review.
Still, SE is the only approach that
focuses intrinsically on the processes
and dynamics that allow deprivation
to arise and persist.
Moreover, the analysis of exclusion
lends itself to the study of structural
characteristics of society and the
situation of marginalised groups (e.g.
ethnic minorities or the landless), whereas
the monetary and capability approaches
tend rather to focus on individual
characteristics and circumstances.
SE leads to a focus on distributional
issues—the situation of those deprived
relative to the norm generally cannot
improve without some redistribution of
opportunities and outcomes. SE also
points to excluders as well as excludees,
again a contrast to the previous
approaches that describe a world without
analysing or attributing responsibility.
The participatory approach (PA) aims to
get people themselves to participate in
decisions about what it means to be
poor and the magnitude of poverty. The
major advantage is that it largely avoids
externally imposed standards. PA also
provides a way of solving some of the
problems encountered with the other
methods. For example, they help to
define: an appropriate minimum basket
of commodities for the monetary
approach; a list of basic capabilities in the
capability approach; and whether the
concept of SE can be applied in a
particular society and what its main
elements might be. The PA method is
complex and invariably contains
multidimensional analysis. Like the SE it
includes processes, causes and outcomes
of poverty, as perceived by the poor. The
PA is apparently cost-effective, but the
community spends much more time on
these exercises.
A critical issue for our comparison is
whether the four approaches identify
broadly the same people as poor; as if
they do the theoretical differences may
be unimportant in policy or targeting
terms. Despite its theoretical deficiencies,
monetary poverty could be used as a
proxy for other types of poverty if
broadly the same people are identified
as poor under the different measures.
Empirical evidence indicates that poverty
rates differ significantly according to the
approach adopted, for countries as a
whole and for regions of the world.
Country ranking differs in comparing
capability poverty and both international
and national monetary poverty lines.
Different measures of deprivation are
associated, and indeed the different
measures do not seem independent
(see page 9). What is striking, however,
is that low levels of poverty according to
one measure are compatible with high
levels of poverty according to another.
It is this variability which points to
the potential lack of overlap in practice
between different ways of measuring
poverty, and it is this variability which
calls for in-depth empirical assessment
of the underlying causes. Such
empirical tests can also show whether
different measures are capturing
different populations.
A study of India and Peru, drawing on
both national data sets and micro-
surveys, found that significantly different
people were identified as poor in the two
countries according to whether the
monetary, capability or participatory
approach was adopted.
The national data sets showed that in
India, using the national poverty line,
monetary poverty, at 38%, was below
capability poverty: 52% of adults were
education poor (illiterate); and 26% of
children were education poor (not
attending primary school); 70% of
children less than 13 years old were
undernourished, 44% severely; but only
7% of individuals between 7 and 59
suffered from chronic illness.
In Peru, in contrast, monetary poverty at
54% (again using a national poverty line)
was greater than capability poverty: 20%
of the adults and 7% of the children were
education poor; 10% of adults were
health poor and 29% of the children
below 5 years were undernourished.
The India/Peru study had problems in
estimating social exclusion. It had been
intended that the participatory focus
groups would define social exclusion, and
this definition would then be applied to
the data set. But none of the participatory
activities generated a definition of social
exclusion—none of the groups saw
themselves as socially excluded.
Poverty definitions and measurement
have important implications for targeting
and policy. The considerable lack
of overlaps between the different
approaches means that targeting
according to one type of poverty
will involve serious targeting errors
in relation to other types. Moreover,
definitions also have implications
for policy. While a monetary approach
suggests a focus on increasing money
incomes (by economic growth, or
redistribution), a capability approach
tends to lead to more emphasis on the
provision of public goods. Social
exclusion draws attention to the need
to break down exclusionary factors,
for example, by redistribution and
antidiscrimination policies.
This suggests that identification and
targeting of the poor with combined
methods should be more widely
adopted, reflecting the current concerns
for a broad characterization of poverty.
Definitions do matter. Clearer and more
transparent definitions of poverty
are an essential prerequisite of any
development policy that puts poverty
reduction at its centre. 
Caterina Ruggeri Laderchi, Ruhi Saith &
Frances Stewart: Does it Matter that we
do not Agree on the Definition of Poverty?
A Comparison of Four Approaches. Oxford
Development Studies, September 2003.12 United Nations Development Programme
Human Development:
Beyond the HDI




Enlarged conception of HD
 1. The HDI itself, which includes health, education and a measure of income
 2. Mental wellbeing – an individual’s psychological state
 3. Empowerment
 4. Political freedom
 5. Social relations
 6. Community well-being
 7. Inequalities
 8. Work conditions
 9. Leisure conditions
10. Political security – freedom from political violence or instability
11. Economic security – freedom from economic fluctuations
12. Environmental conditions
Human Development (HD) has
been defined as ‘a process of enlarging
people’s choices’. Although HD is often
equated with the UNDP’s Human
Development Index (HDI) in popular
discourse, it has long been recognized
that this is an incomplete measure of HD,
leaving out many important aspects of
life; it encompasses only three rather
basic elements of human wellbeing.
Our aim is to identify a broader set of
dimensions of wellbeing constituting HD
and indicators to measure them. We then
explore whether the HDI in fact is a good
measure of the broader dimensions or
whether additional indicators are needed.
Defining what makes for a fulfilled life
has been a central theme of philosophers
and politicians throughout history.
Aristotle’s Ethics, for example, was
devoted to identifying the conditions
needed to achieve eudaimonia, commonly
interpreted as ‘the best life’.
Our first task is to identify which aspects
of life might reasonably qualify as part of
a broader conception of HD. Many
attempts have been made to identify
what makes for a flourishing life. Here we
will consider six lists, each of which
adopts a different philosophical
approach and justification (see page 13).
The lists are not in total agreement; some
emphasize certain aspects more than
others for example regarding material
and mon-material aspects such as
friendship and emotions, and
environmental issues.
Surveying these attempts to define the
full life, we find that they are in broad
agreement about the main dimensions to
be included. In the light of this, we drew
up a list of the categories of life that are
candidates to be included as part of an
enlarged conception of HD (see box below).
Any list of categories is inevitably both
subjective and ethnocentric. Hence, anyone
finding this type of approach helpful
should be able to amend the categorization
to reflect different views. This applies
especially across different cultures.
Unlike some of the reviewed literature
listings of human flourishing, our list does
not include spiritual well-being, due to
problems of definition and measurement.
We separated social relations, which
concerns individuals having satisfactory
relations with others, from community
wellbeing, which concerns the community
as a whole and includes such elements as
low crime rates and a thriving civil society.
We also separated empowerment from
UNDP’s HDI and HPI
measures include  only
 a few basic aspects of
human development.
This article reports  on




found 31 indicators with
different trends  from
each other and  also
from HDI.
Income per capita




requires a broad set
of indicators.
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Requirements for human flourishing
Authors Rawls (1972) Finnis, Grisez, Doyal and Nussbaum Narayan Camfield
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political freedom, as the former focuses
on the lack of power of particular groups,
while the latter relates to liberal political
conditions more generally. We included
inequalities as a general category, because
they affect wellbeing independently,
especially that of the poor.
We then identified indicators of
performance in each of the categories
from international data sets. Analysing
correlations among the indicators within
each category across countries, and
discarding those that are highly correlated
with others in the same category, left 39
indicators to encompass the eleven non-
HDI categories. Of these, eight indicators
are highly correlated with the HDI and
may therefore be represented by it. But 31
are not highly correlated, suggesting that
a full assessment of human development
The Ethical Poverty Line:
A moral definition of
absolute poverty
 by Peter Edward,
Judge Business School,
Cambridge, UK
The first Millennium Development
Goal (MDG) to halve ‘extreme’ poverty
by 2015 has been justified as a moral
duty. However, this morality is only
partial if absolute poverty is defined
by the $1-a-day poverty line. We need
a morally defensible poverty line.
Poverty defined as a lack of well-being is
clearly multidimensional. The MDG and
World Bank $1-a-day poverty line, being
a solely monetary measure, has therefore
rightly been criticised as inadequate
and monodimensional. Yet, it is the most
widely recognised poverty estimate in
use today. The objective of this article is
to demonstrate that, even if we accept
a monetary measure of poverty, the
$1-a-day poverty line is unrealistically
low thus misleading policy makers
and the public on the extent of global
poverty and the scale of redistribution
needed to remove it.
The basis for the $1-a-day poverty line is
simply that it is the median of 10 of the
lowest national poverty lines in the world.
It is not derived from any consideration
of well-being or basic needs. The World
Bank economists most involved in this
area, recently called it ‘frugal’, stating
that it ‘must be deemed a conservative
estimate whereby aggregate poverty in
the developing world is defined by the
perceptions of poverty found in the
poorest countries’. The implication is that
the $1-a-day poverty line is unreasonably
low. Almost certainly it is lower than
developed world populations would
consider morally justifiable. Indeed, the
World Bank does increasingly quote
poverty indices for a $2-a-day line that
seems to be based simply on a doubling
of the $1-a-day poverty line.
World income distribution curves show
the highest population density between
requires a much broader set of indicators
than the HDI alone. We found that under-
five mortality rates do as well as HDI, but
PPP income per capita is less representative
of other dimensions of human
development. The HDI (and the other two
broad indicators) are shown to be worse
indicators of the extended conception of
human development for OECD countries
than for developing countries.
Our research thus explores empirical
correlations, but does not attempt to
investigate causality. We recognize that
our procedures are somewhat arbitrary
and a change in the dimensions used,
the thresholds adopted, etc., would yield
somewhat different results. Our basic
purpose, however, is not to be definitive
but to show that extending the concept
and measurement of Human Development
to a broader set of dimensions seriously
affects the way one should measure and
assess country performance.
In future work in this area, we intend
to identify typologies of developing
countries/regions according to their
success or failure over time with respect
to the different dimensions of HD and
relate this to potential policy choices.
To the extent that data are available,
we would also like to trace the historical
progress of the current OECD countries
in the various categories, which may
help in drawing conclusions about
transitions over time.
Human Development: beyond the
Human Development Index by Gustav
Ranis, Frances Stewart and Emma Samman.
Journal of Human Development 7, 3, 323-358.
“We are one moral universe.
And the shared moral sense
common to us all
makes us recognise
our duty to others.”
Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor
of the Exchequer, advocating
a “Marshall Plan” for
the world’s poor.International Poverty Centre   Poverty In Focus   December  2006    15
the $1-a-day to $2-a-day poverty lines.
Thus, the poverty headcount is very
sensitive to changes in the poverty line,
especially around those levels. If the
public and policy makers are to recognise
just how much poverty there is in the
world, a clear, relevant and morally
justifiable basis for setting the poverty
line becomes essential.
The ethical poverty line (EPL) proposed
here is derived from globally standardised
and ethically justifiable wellbeing
outcomes for which sufficient data
already exist in the World Development
Indicators (WDI). The EPL does not
overcome the inherent problem of all
income poverty lines, namely that they
oversimplify and reduce the complexity
of global poverty to a monodimensional
monetary measure. However, the EPL at
least provides a morally defensible basis
for setting the line.
The intellectual background to the EPL
draws on two specific areas of research;
first by economists on wellbeing
measures and their determinants; and
second on public health, relating
individual life-expectancy to individual
income levels. These two areas can be
combined to derive an international
poverty line directly from aggregate life-
expectancy (i.e. wellbeing) outcomes. The
association between life-expectancy and
income was first explored by health
economists who showed how national
average life-expectancy falls rapidly when
average income levels fall below a critical
level (see figure). A similar correlation was
found by public health researchers
between individual income and life-
expectancy, indicating a maximum life-
expectancy around 73 to 75 years
beyond which increases in income have
little or no further effect.
If poverty is best defined in terms of low
levels of wellbeing rather than income,
and life-expectancy at birth is the
indicator of well-being, then an ethical
poverty line can be developed by
modelling the relation between national
average life-expectancy outcomes and
their underlying source in individual
absolute poverty levels. The model
assumes the observed fact of a “kink” in
the correlation curve indicating the
critical consumption level.
Applying the model to national
populations disaggregated by
consumption level, the statistical
correlation was established between
modelled life-expectancies and the actual
ones published in WDI. Similar correlations
were achieved from the best of the
functions investigated for the model.
Collectively these results set the kink
consumption at between $2.7-a-day and
$3.9-a-day, and probably around $3-a-
day. To err on the side of caution, the
following discussion of the results is
entirely based on the function that sets
kink-consumption at its lowest and hence
least challenging level, namely $2.7-a-day.
The results can be interpreted as
showing that, given the current state of
world development, it is reasonable to
expect to live to 74 years if you have
‘adequate’ consumption. Based on
average performance across the world
(excluding the worst distorting effect of
AIDS in Africa), $2.7-a-day (in 1993 PPP
prices) should be ‘adequate’.
Consumption above this level adds only
nominal years to expected lifespan.
Consumption below this level reduces
expected lifespan dramatically.
Applying an ethical dimension to the
kink model assumes that none of us
would wish to be born into such a low
consumption level that our lifespan
risked dramatic shortening solely as a
result of that poverty. Invoking the
Golden Rule—‘Do unto others as you
would have them do unto you’—we
might argue that every community
should be entitled to achieve a minimum
consumption level sufficient for all
individuals to expect to live a reasonably
full lifespan. On this basis 74 years could
be considered to be a reasonable
lifespan and $2.7-a-day would be the
global ethical poverty line (Global EPL).
In this sense the kink consumption
becomes not only an absolute poverty
line but also an Ethical Poverty Line (EPL).
This Global EPL is obviously significantly
higher than the established $1-a-day line.
However, it is not unreasonable. The
World Bank increasingly uses a $2-a-day
poverty line which is considered to be
more representative of the poverty lines
of middle-income countries. The average
national poverty line in the developing
world is is reported to be close to $2 per
day , providing a further  argument for
raising the international poverty line to
around this level.
This analysis still includes a significant
number of countries in sub-Saharan
Africa, where problems such as AIDS and
civil war lead to premature death. While
these problems are undoubtedly
associated with poverty, they are not
Note: Circles are proportional to population.16 United Nations Development Programme
50% of the world’s population. To remove
poverty at the Minimum EPL level, the
share of the world’s output that these
poor consume would need to increase by
70%. Yet this is still only a poverty gap of
5% of global consumption.
This may look like a fairly small
proportion of global consumption.
It is put more clearly into perspective,
however, by estimating the extent of
redistribution that would be required if
we wanted to eliminate global poverty
today. For example, the cost of ‘merely’
removing $1-a-day poverty would be
equivalent to a 30% global tax on the
consumption of roughly the richest 1%
of world population, affecting one in 10
people in the USA and one in 20 in the UK.
Raising the poverty line to the EPL both
puts many more people in poverty and
raises the threshold that each poor
person has to climb over to get out of
poverty. The redistribution implications
directly caused by a lack of consumption
and they certainly cannot be resolved
merely by increasing the consumption of
the poor. Consequently their inclusion in
the analysis introduces an upward bias
into the EPL calculation that some might
argue was unreasonable.
Recognising this, the EPL has also been
recalculated separating out all of sub-
Saharan Africa. The results are striking.
As expected, this Minimum EPL is lower
than the Global EPL at around $1.9-a-day.
The kink lifespan (72 years) is little altered
and stands in stark contrast to sub-
Saharan Africa. There, the kink lifespan
falls to 48 years, while the very low
poverty line ($0.6-a-day) may well
indicate that, only for those in the
most extreme poverty, do the risks
of premature death from lack of
consumption outweigh the very high
risks of death from other causes. This
may well be striking evidence of the
dramatic impact of AIDS in the region.
What then are the implications of using
the EPL to define absolute poverty? The
table summarises a number of poverty
indicators for the $1-a-day poverty line,
the $1.9-a-day Minimum EPL and the
$2.7-a-day Global EPL. Compared with
the $1-a-day line, the Minimum EPL more
than doubles the number of people
considered to be in poverty to 2.5 billion,
or 40% of the world’s population, while
the Global EPL lifts this to 3 billion, or
of the EPL are huge. For example, the
cost of removing ethical poverty today
(conservatively based on the Minimum
EPL line) would be comparable to an
additional global tax of 30% on all
consumption above US median levels.
As a tax levied on anyone, anywhere in
the world, it would affect 6% of world
population, including half the US
population and one in three people in
the UK. If we wanted to remove ethical
poverty at the higher Global EPL level,
this tax would extend to four-fifths of
the US population and almost three-
quarters of the UK population.
The EPL, therefore, reveals that the price
to be paid for accepting a moral duty to
remove poverty today is one that would
cut deeply into the pockets of developed
world populations.
Peter Edward: The Ethical Poverty Line:
a moral quantification of absolute poverty
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2006.
A New Measure of the
Poverty Line
by Lord Meghnad Desai,
the London School of Economics
There is now  a huge literature on
poverty, its measurement and its cure.
This article concentrates on the question
of drawing up the poverty line, the
absolute level of income or consumption
below which people are said  to be
in poverty.
Two measures are considered as basic
references, (i) the UNDP Human Poverty
Index (HPI, see article by Sakiko Fukuda-
Parr, page 7), which includes life
expectancy, literacy, access to safe water
and child malnutrition as the criteria for
defining the proportion of population
who are poor, and (ii) a new method for
determining the poverty line using
utility theory as proposed by Nanak
Kakwani, International Poverty Centre
(see page 20).
This article suggests a new measure
whereby the two approaches can
be reconciled.
It does so by using the Hicksian concept
of income as the maximum that can be
spent from a stock of capital while
leaving the value of the stock intact. It
links therefore income generation and
consumption to define the poverty line.
Poverty Line
    World Bank
$1-a-day
Indicators from poverty lines
Counting the poor
Poverty head-count (millions) 1050 2500 3100
Poverty rate (head-count as % of global population) 17% 41% 51%
Poverty gap ($billions PPP) 140 900 1980
Poverty gap as % of global GNI 0.7% 4.7% 10.4%
     Minimum EPL
  $1.9-a-day
    Global EPL
  $2.7-a-dayInternational Poverty Centre   Poverty In Focus   December  2006    17
How to draw up the
poverty line, below
which people are
said to be in poverty?
A new measure is
proposed, based on
the need to maintain
a person’s labour
capacity intact.
Definitions of absolute poverty have
been static, calorific, asocial and
atheoretical. Typically a basket of goods
is defined which will, at minimum cost,
afford a required calorific standard to an
individual or a household. That cost is
then augmented to reflect the share of
food in the total budget of a sample
of the population for which the poverty
line is being drawn.
The thus derived poverty line is typically
static since it is taken to be a constant
over time, except for inflation
adjustment. It is asocial since it is uniform
for individuals of all ages and both sexes,
regardless of health status and special
needs. It is atheoretical because the
absolute poverty level concept fixes a
priori an arbitrary level of calories with
no choice involved.
Yet the biggest criticism of such measures
is that they focus on a passive variable,
consumer expenditure, while ignoring
the income generation process.
Inadequate income is after all the root
of poverty.  A composite measure such
as the HPI looks at the family as a whole
and factors in several dimensions
of human poverty. These two ways of
looking at poverty should be combined
into a single one.
We assume a household with some
adults of working age and capacity as
well as children. The adult labour power
is an asset which will yield an income if
employment can be found. Although
the household may also have access to
land and/or credit or some form of non-
human capital, we first focus on labour
power alone in the case of a person
seeking paid work as hired employee.
This capacity to work crucially depends
on food intake, health and literacy.
From these assets the individual can
expect a flow of income, which will
depend on the demand for work and the
wage rate. For someone self-employed,
for example a peasant cultivator, it will
depend upon expectations of yield and
the price of output.
We can define the poverty line as that
level of expected income which allows
the individual to consume enough food
while maintaining his or her labour
power intact. In particular, we can say
that enough food should be purchasable
which will prevent any deterioration in
health. The poverty level will then
crucially depend on the availability of
work and the wage rate. If the individual
cannot earn enough to be able to eat so
as to prevent deterioration in health, and,
in general, labour power, then he or she
is poor.
There are several advantages to this
definition when compared to the
standard definition which relies on
calories. For one thing it is dynamic;
as availability of work or wages change,
e.g. due to seasonal changes or because
the individual’s health may deteriorate,
he or she will move in and out of
poverty. It also relates the consumption
of food to income generation while
avoiding imposing any specific calorific
requirements. It is firmly based in an
economic theoretic definition of income.
The definition connects in an obvious
way to issues of health and nutrition and
thus builds a bridge between monetary
measures and the HPI. In principle,
though data demanding in practice,
we can define this critical food intake at
individual level allowing for age, gender,
health status.
There are of course several caveats
to be added. It is at an individual
level and only for a wage labourer.
It also simplifies the income generation
process by taking the wage as given
and letting the uncertainty attach to
the hours worked. It will need to be
extended to other income generation
processes such as peasant cultivation
whether as a sharecropper or tenant
farmer or small landholder. There is also
the need of aggregating over members
of a household. No doubt others will
point out many more caveats which
need to be made.
But the new approach presents in a
highly simplified fashion a way of
connecting consumption and income
generation via the notion of labour
power/capacity to work. It allows for
different levels of required food
consumption for different individuals
and thus breaks away from any uniform






Poverty incidence may fall
while the number of poor
people grows. Has poverty
then fallen or risen?
Most poverty measures
show a decrease when
the mortality among
poor people is higher
than that of the rest.
Should those who would
have been alive but for
their poverty be included
when counting the poor?
Is poverty unchanged
when as many people
have become poor as
those who have
escaped poverty?
The basic structure of poverty
measurement has been built on
intuitions that are strong when the
population whose poverty is being
measured is fixed and given. But when it
is changing, standard measures of poverty
can lead to uncomfortable or dissonant
conclusions. To illustrate and explain this
point, I want to consider income
distribution at two points in time when
the population has also changed in some
way. I will look at three population size
scenarios—increased,  decreased, and
unchanged but with churning around a
constant income distribution.
Consider a country where the incidence
of poverty is falling by 1 percentage point
per annum but population is rising by 2
percentage points per annum. Poverty as
normally measured—the number of poor
people as a proportion of total
population—has fallen. But the absolute
number of the poor has risen. This is not
just a statistical curiosum, but it can
occur, and has occurred in countries, like
those in Africa, where population growth
is relatively high.
Such an outcome can lead, and has led, to
dissonance between the claims of
economists that poverty has fallen, and
the ground level, lived experience of those
who work with the poor and of the poor
themselves. “How,” the latter group exclaim,
“can you economists claim that poverty
has gone down, when the soup kitchens
are fuller than ever before and there are
more street children than ever before?”
The answer is found in some variant or
other of the “population replication
axiom”, which undergirds every
commonly used measure of poverty.
Imagine two societies identical in
everyway. There is poverty in each, but it
is identical poverty. Now imagine that we
combine these two societies into one.
Would you say that poverty has stayed
the same, or doubled? The population
replication axiom asserts categorically
that poverty is unchanged. From this
comes the mathematical form of most of
our poverty indices, where total population
is found in the denominator of the
formula. But if you would say that in this
example poverty has doubled, because
there are twice as many poor people,
then you would not buy into the
population replication axiom. I believe
that most ground level activists, those
who actually deal with poverty, would
indeed be concerned about the larger
numbers of the poor.
Since the issue is about an axiom, it is not
necessarily about being “right” or “wrong”.
At the very least it is about seeing things
in different ways, and it is about asking
statistical agencies to produce both sorts
of numbers—normalized by population
size, and not so normalized. It is good
that the World Bank has started doing
this. With this information, we might
better understand the incomprehension
of those who see official poverty figures
going down while experienced poverty,
the number of the poor, goes up.
Let me now construct another scenario.
Starting from a given distribution of
income, suppose that some of the poor
die because of poverty. Of course, the
absolute number of poor goes down. It is
easy to check that even the proportion of
poor will go down. Thus the conflict
discussed above is no longer present.
Poverty has gone down whichever way
you measure it, but only because poverty has
killed the poor! And this is not just a
curiosum either. This phenomenon will be
present to some extent whenever mortality
is higher among the poor than among the
rich, which is of course a very commonly
observed phenomenon. And it will arise
for a wide variety of poverty measures, not
just the incidence of poverty. Moreover,International Poverty Centre   Poverty In Focus   December  2006    19
the issue arises also in the measurement
of health status of a population, and in
the discussion of whether AIDS deaths
can deliver a dividend in the form of
an increase in per capita income.
This cannot be right. We cannot have our
standard poverty measures rewarding
policies that reduce poverty by eliminating
the poor. Put another way, we cannot
have our standard poverty measures
penalizing policies that prevent the
deaths of the poor. And yet, the Number
1 Millennium Development Goal, of
halving the incidence of poverty over a
given length of time, is wide open to this
objection. We have been led, somewhat
unthinkingly, into this trap because the
intuitions that work well when population
is fixed go awry when it is changing.
The answer to this conundrum is not easy,
because among other things it forces us
to ask how far back we want to go in
evaluating today’s poverty. Had some
poor children who died yesterday been
alive today, poverty would have been
higher. But how would we count those
who died a hundred years ago because
of poverty? If a year ago is too short, and
a hundred years ago is too long, where
in between is the right cut-off?
An alternative is to have measures of
income poverty stay as they are, but also
include measures of mortality (among
the poor) in our evaluation. This is the
direction taken by UNDP’s Human Poverty
Index, which has the proportion of people
likely to die before the age of 60 as a
component along with an income poverty
measure. But the specific assumptions
underlying any measure need to be made
clear; in particular how to define the
population whose wellbeing is being
evaluated. Those currently alive, which is
the present empirical method, and which
gets us into the difficulties noted above?
Or do we include some of those who
would have been alive but for their
poverty? An explicit derivation of
measures that satisfy key assumptions
and basic intuitions is some ways away.
Let us finally turn to a situation where
both the population and the income
distribution is unchanging, but the
different income slots are occupied
by different individuals at different times.
In other words, there is mobility. Consider
the simplest case, where there are two
income levels, one below the poverty line
and one above the poverty line. In one
society, the rich stay rich and the poor
stay poor. In another, the rich and poor
swap places every period. To keep tings
conceptually simple, let there be no
saving or investment, so that income is
consumption. The snapshot poverty
(income or consumption) is unchanging
period to period, of course, and is the
same in the two societies. But are these two
societies really the same in terms of poverty?
The answer depends on our intuitions
of what the experience of poverty means,
and whether the experience of poverty in
one period for an individual can be
“washed away” by an above poverty line
experience in another. Imagine yourself at
the end of Shakespeare’s play, King Lear.
You see a once powerful man brought
low and you heart goes out to him. Then
someone says, “Well, you know, the first
fifty years of his life weren’t all that bad,
and all in all….” To aggregate over Lear’s
life is to miss the point and the
poignancy of his downfall.
To aggregate poverty experiences with
above poverty line experiences for an
individual is equally, in my view, to miss
the point about poverty—at least if we
take the idea of poverty seriously enough
to set it apart from non-poverty, as we
do in the way that we measure poverty.
On the King Lear view, therefore, the two
societies I described above have the same
poverty. If this makes you uncomfortable,
and at the same time you find something
compelling about the Lear example, then
you will agree that this issue has not
been fully addressed in our measurement
of poverty.
The three conundrums exposited here are
meant not to paralyze the measurement of
poverty but to invigorate the discussion
of the assumptions that underlie the
standard measures of poverty. I look
forward to the response. 
Chakravarty, Satya R., Ravi Kanbur and
Diganta Mukherjee. 2006. “Population
Growth and Poverty Measurement.” Social
Choice and Welfare, Vol.26, pp 471-483.
Kanbur, Ravi and Diganta Mukherjee. 2006.
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not just low income;
measures must relate
closely to people’s lives.
Poverty is failure of socially
determined basic capabilities,
but only when caused by lack
of resources.
A new international poverty
line is needed. It should reflect
the cost of basic human needs.
According to the 2000 World
Development Report (WDR), “poverty is
pronounced deprivation in wellbeing”.
But what does wellbeing mean? How
do we define it? What are the elements
necessary to ensure a decent level of
wellbeing? These are not easy
questions to answer.
In the socioeconomic literature, several
approaches have been used to describe
wellbeing; important among them are
basic needs, economic growth, quality
of life and welfare. How do these
approaches differ? And, which
approach is the most appropriate to
describe wellbeing? This article deals,
briefly, with these broad questions.
In any society, some people obviously
enjoy higher levels of wellbeing than
others. Poverty is viewed here as the
lowest level of wellbeing, which is
experienced by those people in society
who are so deprived that they are
unable to function with dignity. As
stated in the 2002 WDR, to be poor “is to
be hungry, to lack shelter and clothing,
to be sick and not cared for, to be
illiterate and not schooled”.
Economic growth provides greater
command over goods and services
and thus, on average, gives people
greater choices. However, this does
not necessarily imply higher wellbeing
for everyone; the benefits of economic
growth are never shared equally.
Increasing per capita income is not
an appropriate indicator of changes
in the aggregate wellbeing. Economic
growth is a means and not an end
of development and thus must be
supplemented with indicators that are
more closely related to individual lives.
People want income because it gives
them the possession of commodities,
which they consume. The higher the
income the greater the command people
have over commodities. The possession
of commodities, which include services,
provides people with the means to lead
a better life; thus, the possession of
commodities or opulence is closely
related to the quality of life people
lead. But it is only a means to an end.
As Amartya Sen points out, “ultimately,
the focus has to be on what we can or
cannot do, can or cannot be”. Thus,
wellbeing must be seen in terms of
individual achievements and not in
terms of means that individuals possess.
The wellbeing or standard of living is not
about the possession of commodities,
but it is about living. This line of
reasoning led Sen to develop the
ideas of “functionings and capabilities”.
Thus, a ‘functioning’ is an achievement,
and a ‘capability’ is the ability to achieve.
Functionings are directly related to what
kind of life people actually lead, whereas
capabilities are connected with the
freedom people have in the choice of
life they lead, which is their functionings.
Income allows an individual to purchase
commodities with which he or she
generates various functionings. But all
individuals cannot convert commodities
into functionings to the same degree.
For instance, a disabled person may
not be able to do many things that an
able-bodied individual can do with the
same commodity. Thus, in measuring
wellbeing or standard of living, our
focus should be on the achievements
of people and not on the commodities
they possess.
It may seem obvious that the higher
the income people have, the greater
will be their capabilities. After all, it is an
observed fact that rich countries do have
a higher standard of living than poorInternational Poverty Centre   Poverty In Focus   December  2006    21
It would be odd




It is about capabilities
and achievements.
countries. But the relationship between
the two is not as simple as it appears. For
instance, consider a country, which has
succeeded in reducing mortality so much
that its per capita GDP falls because of
the resulting increase in population; has
the country’s living standard improved or
deteriorated? The answer is not clear. The
fall in per capita income shows that the
average citizen has become poorer, while
at the same time the country has extended
the capability of its citizens to live a
longer life. This example demonstrates
the complex nature of the relationship
between the income and the capabilities
people possess.
It is not uncommon to think that
ultimately it is the happiness of people
that really counts.  Could we then
measure wellbeing by the degree of
happiness enjoyed by the people?
The answer is no. Sen argues that living
standards cannot be the same thing
as happiness.  People can be happy or
unhappy irrespective of how they live
or do not live. In India many people live
in severe poverty with no access to the
basic amenities of life, but they may still
be happy because of the religious belief
that in their next life they will be better
off. Indeed, they believe that the more
they suffer in this life, the better off they
will be in their next life. These religious
beliefs may help people to suffer happily
but they do not improve their living
conditions. Wellbeing is about
capabilities and achievements.
The level of happiness can still be a good
indicator of people’s wellbeing, but it is
not the same thing. Happiness can only
be measured by people’s perceptions,
which may change drastically in a short
period. Thus, the level of happiness alone
would not be a stable or suffcient
indicator of wellbeing. It may change
without any change in people’s actual
levels of living.
The income approach views poverty as
deprivation of income (or consumption).
Poverty is defined by a poverty line, i.e.
the minimum income needed to be able
to satisfy minimum basic needs. But
income is not the only kind of deprivation
people may suffer. Although income
deprivation may give rise to several other
kinds of deprivations, people may suffer
acute deprivation in many aspects of life
even if they possess adequate command
over commodities. It is the low level of
wellbeing which is important rather than
low level of income.
Thus, poverty should be viewed as the
deprivation of basic capabilities rather
than merely as low level of income.
Poverty encompasses not only material
deprivation (measured by income or
consumption) but also many other forms
of deprivations in different aspects of life
such as unemployment, ill health, lack of
education, vulnerability, powerlessness,
social exclusion and so on.
Under the capability deprivation
approach, an individual may be defined
as poor if he or she lacks basic
capabilities. What are these basic
capabilities? How do we identify them?
This is an issue of value judgment. It
depends on how a society prioritizes
different capabilities. These priorities may
also depend on a country’s economic
resources. There is no clear-cut formula
for determining basic capabilities.
Can we describe poverty purely in terms
of capability deprivation? Suppose that
a millionaire, who has all the economic
means to buy anything, has a disease
or disability which prevents him from
achieving some basic functionings. He
or she is surely suffering from a serious
capability deprivation in spite of having
all the best medical facilities at his or her
disposal. Yet, it would be odd to call this
millionaire “poor”.
Poverty is present when basic capability
failure arises because a person has
inadequate command over resources,
whether through market or non-market
sources. By examining capability
deprivation alone, we cannot always
identify persons who are poor in this
specific sense. Accordingly, a distinction
should be made between capability
deprivation in general and poverty
specifically. Poverty results from the
inadequacy of command over resources
needed to generate socially determined
basic capabilities, whereas capability
deprivation is more general and may
be caused by a host of factors.
Among them, income or entitlement to
resources may not be the most important.
Thus, a person may suffer capability
deprivation but still may not always be
poor. Defining poverty from the capability
perspective cannot be done independently
of income. The capabilities to function,
which are linked to poverty, are those
derivable from income. Income or
command over recourses cannot be
separated from capability, but at the
same it must be recognized that the link
between them is far from simple.
Individuals have different needs and,
therefore, differ with respect to their
ability to convert incomes or resources
they have into capabilities to function.
Thus different individuals will require
different resources to achieve basic
capabilities. It is best that any proposed
income measure of poverty be constructed
from capabilities. The choice of a poverty
line should reflect the cost of achieving
basic human needs.
However, that is not the case with the
most frequently used international
poverty measure, the PPP $1/day per
person. It was constructed by World
Bank researchers in 1990 as the median
of the lowest ten national poverty lines
available in a sample of 33 countries.
It has been shown that a person may
not attain income-dependent basic
capabilities even with an income
sufficient to count as non-poor
according to the $1/day yardstick.
If the reduction of poverty, as properly
understood, is to be achieved, then new
measures of its extent and distribution
in the world will be required.
Nanak Kakwani and Hyun H. Son: “New
Global Poverty Counts”, Working paper no. 29,
UNDP International Poverty Centre,
September 2006.22 United Nations Development Programme 22 United Nations Development Programme
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They should be further
developed rather than
confining interest to
income poverty lines alone.
Re: Poverty and Wellbeing
Nanak Kakwani’s careful and clear article acknowledges the conceptual
inadequacies of aggregate economic growth and happiness as representations of
wellbeing or poverty. It then argues that poverty should be viewed as the deprivation
of basic capabilities rather than merely as low level of income. Moreover it states that
the selection of basic capabilities is a value judgement and that there is no clear-cut
formula for determining basic capabilities. It further states: “Poverty encompasses not
only material deprivation (measured by income or consumption) but also many other
forms of deprivations in different aspects of life such as unemployment, ill health, lack
of education, vulnerability, powerlessness, social exclusion and so on.”  This broad view
of the possible elements of poverty seems exactly right.
At the close the article takes two quite interesting turns, first back to resource-based
definitions of poverty and second back to income-based definitions of capability
poverty. Although I am not entirely sure I have interpreted these correctly, I would like
to draw attention to these turns, and also to other possible avenues for exploration.
Having established that “poverty should be viewed as the deprivation of basic
capabilities”, Kakwani then appears to argue that this is the case only when poverty is
caused by resource deprivation: “Poverty is present when basic capability failure arises
because a person has inadequate command over resources, whether through market or
non-market sources.” He poses the case of a millionaire with an illness that prevents
him or her from achieving a basic functioning. The millionaire is capability deprived –
despite having splendid medical care – but should not, he argues, be called ‘poor’.
The article closes with a discussion of the most frequently used poverty line – $1 a day
per person.  Here the article takes a turn, arguing that despite the complexity of the
relationship between capabilities and income, “defining poverty from the capability
perspective cannot be done independently of income”. An alternative reading of
Kakwani’s last argument is that capability poverty might be defined in other ways, but
in those situations in which income poverty lines are to be constructed, the basis of their
construction should be some kind(s) of capability deprivation.
The article contains three quite distinct lines of thought:
• Poverty should be viewed as the set of deprivations of basic capabilities.
• Poverty refers to the subset of basic capability deprivations that are caused by
inadequate command over resources.
• Poverty refers to basic capability deprivation insofar as this can be represented
by income poverty lines or in income space.
I would warmly endorse the first of these, but reframe the second and third, to argue
a) that poverty should be defined normatively not according to its cause but according
to whether it can be influenced by public action, and b) that multidimensional poverty
comparisons should be developed to displace income poverty lines (although when
the latter are used they should be pegged to basic capabilities).
Consider the ill millionaire, and compare her with a vivacious millionaire. Perhaps the
‘basic functioning’ that her illness prevents is the physical ability to be nourished; thus
issues of energy and indeed survival reemerge constantly. Clearly this capability
deprivation is caused by some condition other than resource deprivation. Should she
be considered poor? The category of ‘capability deprivation’ allows Kakwani to describe
the difference between our rail-thin millionaire and a plump and vivacious millionaire.
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inadequate resources, it seems that Kakwani wishes to define poverty not descriptively but normatively as capability deprivations
that can (and should) be addressed by public action (by which we might mean not only action of the state sector but also of NGOs,
business, and civil society). The problem with defining poverty according to its cause is not only that it is difficult to establish
causality, but it may not be necessary: basic capabilities can often be expanded by public action regardless of causation.
When we use the term poverty as a moral or normative concept that serves as a trigger for action (rather than as a description, which
one could also do), one might instead define poverty as the subset of basic capability deprivations that are “socially influenceable.”
In his article “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights,” Sen argued that capabilities could be selected for special attention on the basis
of two criteria. First, they were of special importance (that is, they were judged to be basic capabilities). Second, they were socially
influenceable. For example, tranquility of mind or serenity of heart may be tremendously important to many – both the destitute and
the wealthy – but it is not terribly amenable to change by concerted public action. This definition might achieve Kakwani’s objective
without requiring neither the establishment of causality, nor the definition of what counts as command over resources.
A third point concerns how to establish income poverty lines. Kakwani acknowledges the difficulties in using income to indicate
basic capabilities because of people’s very different personal conversion factors (as well as, we might observe, different institutional
and market contexts), but argues that income poverty should be grounded on capability deprivation rather than on absolute income
level such as $1/day. The only peculiarity with this argument is that it neither defends nor critically examines the focus on income
space. Income poverty lines adjusted to reflect some basic functioning, such as nutritional status, or (and this is quite different) to
reflect a resource, such as a caloric line, have a conceptual advantage over current PPP lines. But there are numerous ways to measure
capability deprivation.
Foster and Sen describe four. The first is the ‘direct’ approach that employed indicators of functionings either alone, in a disaggregated
way or aggregated into a multidimensional index such as the Human Poverty Index (HPI) or the Bourguignon-Chakravarty Index,
which specifies a ‘poverty line’ for each of multiple dimensions of poverty. The second supplemented income measures informally
with other measures, perhaps akin to contemporary poverty profiles. The third sets income poverty lines with respect to capabilities,
for example through equivalence scales; the fourth examines partial orderings of ordinal intensity (for example DALYs and their
successor indicators).
Research has broken open multidimensional poverty measurement and is actively developing multidimensional measures such as
indices, poverty profiles, and stochastic dominance comparisons. Given their promise, measurement of capability poverty should
involve and further develop these measures rather than confining interest to income poverty lines alone. 
Sen, A. K., On Economic Inequality with a substantial annexe ‘after a Quarter Century’ by J Foster and A Sen. 2nd Edition. (Oxford: Clarendon
Oxford Press, 1997).
Sen, A. K., ‘Elements of a Theory of Human Rights’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 234 (2004).
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Sabina Alkire’s gracious response even strengthens my argument that a distinction should be made between capability deprivation in
general and poverty specifically. Poverty is concerned with the inadequacy of command over resources needed to generate socially
determined basic capabilities, whereas capability deprivation is more general and may be caused by a host of factors. It seems that
Alkire accepts our view that poverty is a subset of capability deprivations, which is generally not recognized.  We define this subset
as the one arising due to inadequate command over resources, whereas Alkire seems to agree with the one that can be influenced
by public action. Any public action intended to reduce poverty basically provides (directly or indirectly) additional command over
resources to those people who lack them. Thus, if we understand her position correctly, there is but little difference in our views.
There are two distinct problems in measuring poverty. The first is identifying the poor, and the second is aggregating poverty. My
article is mainly concerned with the first issue, while for example the HPI is a response to the second. The identification problem is
clearly prior to aggregation. It would be odd to identify a millionaire as poor even when suffering from a basic capability deprivation.
Thus, defining poverty from the capability perspective cannot be done independently of income. In this context, the issue of
establishing causality is not all that difficult. Moreover, in the formulation of public policies, we have to confront causal relationships
even if they are difficult to establish.
A poverty line should not be a single number defined in income space. Since different individuals differ with respect to their ability
to convert income or resources into capabilities to function, they require different resources to achieve basic capabilities. It means
that different individuals will have different poverty lines to be able to enjoy the same basic capabilities.  In our view the concept of
poverty line is multidimensional because it takes into account people’s individual differences in the enjoyment of a set of basic
capabilities. Thus, the poverty lines properly constructed can reflect different interpersonal conversion rates as well institutional
differences. Sabina Alkire’s criticisms are mainly directed to a unitary income poverty line, which obviously is not our view. International Poverty Centre
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